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Therapeutic jurisprudence, now almost reflexively defined as
either the "study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent" or the
"study of the law as a therapeutic agent,"1 has made tremendous
strides in its efforts to reach across disparate fields of legal doctrine to
elucidate the therapeutic aspects of various tenets of those doctrines.
Similarly, the methods used to explicate the therapeutic jurisprudence
(TJ) message have benefited from cross-disciplinary cross-pollination,
particularly within the social sciences, and from collaboration with
other legal analytical methods. However, TJ in the appellate arena
remains largely unexplored. This omission is unfortunate, as TJ
analysis is perhaps most conducive to policymaking tasks, for which
appellate courts are best suited. Accordingly, appellate courts repre-
sent an especially fertile and appropriate forum for TJ-inspired
advocacy.
This Article begins with a modest objective and ends with an
ambitious one. First, it asserts that appellate courts are an appropriate
forum for considering the therapeutic impact of the law strand of TJ
* Director, Glenn M. Weaver Institute of Law and Psychiatry and Adjunct Professor,
University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. A Westlaw search of law reviews and journals reveals 20 instances of the term therapeu-
tic jurisprudence defined as the "study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent," and four
instances of the term defined as "study of the law as a therapeutic agent." Search of Westlaw,
"jlr" database (Jan. 16, 2000). Wexler and Winick have defined the term in both fashions. See
Bruce J. Winick, Coercion and Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1145, 1156
(1997) ("study of the law as a therapeutic agent"); David B. Wexler, New Directions in Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 759, 761 (1993) (same); see also David B. Wexler, Introduction to the
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Symposium, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 263, 263 (1999) ("study of the role of the
law as a therapeutic agent"); Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 184, 185 (1997) (same).
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scholarship. TJ's character as a "field of social inquiry" 2 is especially
suited to the appellate courts' task of formulating new rules of law and
choosing among competing policy objectives when resolving opposing
normative principles.
Because TJ faces a peculiar "empirical indeterminacy"-the
tendency of TJ proponents to rely on social science data requiring
"painstaking"4 construction of methodologies to evaluate its hypo-
theses-TJ's persuasive force remains primarily theoretical and specu-
lative. Accordingly, presenting TJ-inspired analysis through appellate
briefs may be the default mechanism for now. However, once
increasingly sophisticated empirical research tools are refined or devel-
oped, or where such methods currently exist, the most appropriate
forum for TJ-inspired advocacy should be the appellate arena.
Empirical research data used to support TJ propositions are pro-
perly characterized as one species of "legislative facts"-facts not only
relevant to legal reasoning when formulating a legal principle, but to
the lawmaking process generally-and are thus susceptible to judicial
notice.' Although considering legislative facts is certainly an appro-
priate task for trial courts when resolving particular factual contro-
versies, legislative facts are particularly conducive to the appellate
courts' task of considering normative values when creating new law.
Finally, this Article suggests that if TJ ultimately embraces an
ideological agenda such as the one recently recommended by Professor
La Fond,6 the intriguing notion of a legislative fact remand should be
considered. Though the mechanism has rarely been used, the notion
of a legislative fact remand is hardly novel, and the appellate courts'
ability to resolve cases creatively has received increasing attention in
recent years. In many cases, remanding to the trial court for the deter-
mination of legislative facts creates an opportunity to present empiri-
cal data in support of a TJ proposition without misrepresenting its
potentially policy-oriented and normative character. Furthermore, the
intriguing notion of a legislative fact remand preserves the opportunity
to present empirical data to support the consideration of therapeutic
2. Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 505, 508 (1998).
3. Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 193, 204 (1995).
4. Id. at 207.
5. See Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942); Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945,
952 (1955); FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
6. See John Q. La Fond, Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral? Sexual
Predator Laws: Their Impacts on Participants and Policy, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 377-78 (1999).
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values without misrepresenting TJ's potentially policy-oriented and
normative character.
II. DISTINGUISHING THE Two STRANDS OF
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
TJ recognizes that rules of law, legal procedures, and legal and
law-related roles, such as those played by attorneys, judges and other
professionals performing quasi-legal functions, produce therapeutic or
antitherapeutic consequences for those who come into contact with
those rules, procedures, or roles. The TJ heuristic is typically used to
draw attention to these consequences and to explore whether their
desirable psychological effects may be enhanced or their undesirable
effects reduced without disturbing the balance of social policy consid-
erations already engrafted onto those rules, procedures, or roles.
A more holistic, integrative, and transformative approach to legal
practice-an approach that perhaps implicitly emphasizes the salubri-
ous effects of the legal profession on its participants' psychological
well-being-has been undoubtedly embraced pell-mell by practi-
tioners for decades.7 However, this approach has not had the benefit
of either a formalized theoretical framework or the legitimacy that
inheres in express ratification by the legal academy. Since TJ's intro-
duction on a broad scale in 1990,8 express and deliberate delineation of
the TJ method has animated a great deal of thoughtful scholarship
under TJ's imprimatur.
7. See generally David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft
Spots and Strategies, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 317, 320 (1998) ("Of course, as the previous articles
have noted, many client-centered lawyers already practice with a real sensitivity to these con-
cerns. Many regard themselves first and foremost as counselors, or even as "holistic' lawyers.");
Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law: A Combined
Concentration to Invigorate the Everyday Practice of Law, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 29 (1997) ("Of
course, many fine lawyers already blend elements of preventive law with concerns for a client's
psychological well-being."); Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 17
n.14 (1997) ("Interestingly, many good lawyers practice preventive law instinctively; however,
far fewer explicitly refer to their work as involving preventive law.").
8. The 1990 publication of David Wexler's monograph, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The
Law as a Therapeutic Agent, is generally regarded as stimulating the explosion in TJ scholarship.
See Susan Daicoff, Making Law Therapeutic for Lawyers: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive
Law, and the Psychology of Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 811, 811 n.2 (1999). The ori-
gin of the term "therapeutic jurisprudence" itself derives from an NIMH workshop in October
1987, where David Wexler presented a paper laying out a perspective of "law as therapy," which
he termed "juridical psychotherapy." David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic Juris-
prudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691, 693 (1999). As recounted by
Wexler, that term did not survive the feedback presented at the meeting, and the term "thera-
peutic jurisprudence" was substituted. Id.
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One strand of TJ scholarship focuses on ways in which legal
roles, such as those as played by attorneys and judges, and legal pro-
cedures, such as sentencing hearings, civil commitment hearings, and
mediations, may be ameliorated to increase their therapeutic effects or
to minimize their antitherapeutic effects without sacrificing other
values actualized within those roles and procedures.
This aspect of TJ, which Professor Wexler once termed "thera-
peutic legal administration," 9 is made possible through the distillation
of form by extracting the substantive elements of legal content. TJ of
this character is within what might be termed a "pure method" para-
digm, where legal methods, practices, and procedures are sufficiently
desiccated from their underlying value-laden objects of regulation and
the baggage of social policy concerns to allow for evaluation of the
therapeutic effects of their method qua method.
This endeavor, the central object of which is to examine legal
method as a therapeutic agent, has made tremendous strides within the
forum where theoretical discourse is likely to operate in practice,
having forged a symbiotic relationship with the movement known as
preventive law.' ° The complementary relationship between the two
movements emphasizes the role of lawyer-as-counselor, and it
acknowledges a perspective of TJ scholarship that is familiar, and
perhaps even prosaic, to most practitioners.
This perspective should be contrasted with TJ scholarship that
evaluates the therapeutic impact of particular rules of law themselves.
The primary focus of that TJ scholarship is to examine law itself as a
therapeutic agent. This second strand of TJ scholarship is founded
upon the express objective of TJ to inform legal decision-making, on
both a legislative and judicial level, of the therapeutic consequences of
any particular decision. "The therapeutic jurisprudence approach
[argues]... that empirical information from the social sciences can
9. David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 220, 234 (1995). Professor Wexler notes that because the study of "therapeutic legal
administration" does not focus on changes "even in a single rule of law or legal procedure," id.,
the analysis may not "really" be legal at all. Id. at 225. Nonetheless, Wexler emphasizes that
future research in this area is vitally important, as the success or failure of any legal rule may
depend more on its method of administration than on its substantive content. Id.
10. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, End-of-Life Decision Making, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
and Preventive Law: Hierarchical v. Consensus-Based Decision-Making Model, 41 ARIZ. L. REV.
329 (1999); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmar-
ried Committed Partners: Empirical Lessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic Approach, 41 ARIZ.
L. REV. 417 (1999); Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 17
(1997); Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law: A




inform legal decision-making and should indeed be taken into account
in legal decision-making."" The difference between the two strands
of TJ scholarship is not merely semantic; they diverge conceptually
with respect to the objects of their inquiry, their catalogues of outcome
measures, and, possibly, the perception of TJ by the legal profession.
Unlike TJ scholarship's "therapeutic administration' 12 strand,
precious little has been written about the mechanisms through which
the "therapeutic impact of law" strand may be formally introduced
into legal and judicial decision-making processes. The bulk of existing
discourse is primarily theoretical, though its proponents have relied on
empirical behavioral science research when available. This existing
discourse is designed to articulate the specific antitherapeutic effects of
particular legal rules, and how legal reform may be achieved by taking
those effects into account. If the therapeutic impact of law is to be an
important determinant of policy in judicial decision-making processes,
the question remains: How should courts, and appellate courts in
particular, obtain "evidence" of this therapeutic impact?
III. THE CONSIDERATION OF THERAPEUTIC VALUES
BY APPELLATE COURTS
Despite its interdisciplinary focus and heavy reliance on social
science data, TJ's "therapeutic impact" strand should be distinguished
from fields such as law and psychology and social science in law,
which simply offer empirical methods of examining legal rules without
connecting those methods to any particular normative agendas.' 3 It
appears settled that "therapeutic impact" embraces an agenda that is
more than merely descriptive in character. Rather, TJ offers a pre-
scriptive agenda, arguing that policymakers should incorporate knowl-
edge of the therapeutic consequences of law into their decision-making
processes. As stated by Professor Winick,
Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that, other things being
equal, positive therapeutic effects are desirable and should gen-
erally be a proper aim of law, and that antitherapeutic effects are
undesirable and should be avoided or minimized. Because this
normative agenda drives therapeutic jurisprudence research, it is
11. Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A Therapeutic jurispru-
dence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 579, 580
(1992). See also David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New
Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991).
12. Supranote 7.
13. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 184, 188 (1997).
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not the neutral, value-free mode of scholarly inquiry that law
and psychology and social science in law often try to be. 4
Thus far, TJ's prescriptive character has been procedural in
nature, limiting its emphasis to specific suggestions concerning the
proper components of legal decision-making. With few exceptions,15
it has not offered a hierarchical ordering of therapeutic concerns vis-a-
vis competing normative principles. Therefore, TJ may be character-
ized as a "procedurally normative" enterprise rather than as a
substantively normative approach, which is emblematic of other juris-
prudences such as critical race theory, law and economics, and
feminist jurisprudence.
By suggesting the need to identify the therapeutic and antithera-
peutic consequences of legal rules and practices, we do not
necessarily suggest that such rules and practices be recast to
accomplish therapeutic ends or to avoid antitherapeutic results.
Whether they should is, of course, a normative question that
calls for a weighing of other potentially relevant normative
values as well, such as patient autonomy, constitutional rights,
and community safety.' 6
Professor La Fond recently challenged TJ's willingness to strad-
dle the normative fence of competing ideological values, articulating
the question as whether "the antitherapeutic impact of law in a
particular case [may be] so severe that TJ must insist ... that other
values and consequences are paramount."' 7  Arguing that TJ must
emerge from its backdrop of relative normative neutrality and cast its
14. Id. See also Slobogin, supra note 3, at 198 ("In short, TJ can be distinguished from
social science in law, despite the reliance of both on social science research, because the latter is a
technological means of answering questions posed by the law, whereas the former is a prescrip-
tive jurisprudence that happens to rely on that technology.").
15. See, e.g., La Fond, supra note 6; see also Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the
Structure of the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 161 (1995).
16. David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Criminal Justice
Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 225, 226 (1992). See
also Winick, supra note 13, at 191 ("Therapeutic jurisprudence therefore does not suggest that
therapeutic considerations should outweigh other normative values that law may properly seek to
further.").
Wexler has elaborated on this point:
Therapeutic jurisprudence does not suggest that therapeutic considerations should
trump other considerations. Therapeutic considerations are but one category of
important considerations, as are autonomy, integrity of the factfinding process, and
community safety. Therapeutic jurisprudence does not itself purport to resolve the
value questions; instead, it sets the stage for their sharp articulation.
David B. Wexler, An Orientation to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 259,259-60 (1994).
17. La Fond, supra note 6, at 377.
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lot with the policy objective of promoting positive therapeutic conse-
quences, La Fond forcefully states that "TJ must take a normative
stance and assert that the law should be repealed or substantially
changed."'"8
The primary distinction between TJ within a "substantively nor-
mative" framework, such as the one recommended by La Fond, and
the "procedurally normative" framework thus far espoused by TJ pro-
ponents, concerns the extent to which one is willing to take a position
on the relative importance of therapeutic values vis-a-vis other policy
considerations. However, for purposes of this Article, it should be
clear that whether or not TJ accepts La Fond's invitation or chooses to
remain normatively neutral with respect to competing ideologies,
appellate courts will remain the appropriate arena for considering
therapeutic values.
One of the fundamental insights of legal realism was the recogni-
tion that courts "must sometimes stray from the traditional role of
applying previously existing law and venture into the realm of creating
new law."19 In general, courts will be called upon to "create new law"
in three distinct situations: (1) cases raising novel issues of fact for
which the application of any existing rule of law is inapposite; (2) cases
requiring the application of existing rules of law which are vague or
ambiguous; and (3) cases requiring a hierarchical ordering of compet-
ing rules of law.2"
In the first and third situations, "judges must move beyond the
most typical forms of reasoning-rule-based and analogical reason-
ing-and employ other methods, such as normative and policy-based
reasoning. ' 21  Rule-based and analogical reasoning methods are not
particularly conducive to the consideration of therapeutic effects,
because, as TJ scholarship often emphasizes, little attention was paid
to such effects when current rules of law were formulated.22 In
contrast, the components of normative and policy-based reasoning
methods typical of appellate courts, such as "aesthetic principles,
scientific models, social organization, economic analysis, efficiency
18. Id. at 378.
19. Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate
Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197, 197 (2000).
20. See id. See also Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058-59
(1975).
21. Margolis, supra note 19, at 197-98.
22. See Hafemeister, supra note 10, at 331 ("However, the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic
impact of the law is often overlooked."); Winick, supra note 13, at 188 ("A sensitive policy ana-
lysis of law should seek to measure and weigh all of the various costs and benefits of legal rules.
One important but previously neglected aspect of this policy calculus is the therapeutic impact of
law.").
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concerns, political realities, and predictable psychological reactions, "23
are well-suited to TJ-inspired argumentation. In short, TJ's character
as "a field of social inquiry designed to produce law reform that will
enhance the law's potential as a healing and health-promoting force,
24
demonstrates that, whether or not one ranks therapeutic values
alongside other normative values, TJ scholarship is likely to receive its
greatest audience in the appellate arena.
IV. THERAPEUTIC VALUES AS LEGISLATIVE FACTS
TJ's "therapeutic impact" strand suffers from what Slobogin
refers to as "the dilemma of empirical indeterminacy" 25-the predica-
ment that the "types of empirical questions TJ asks may be particu-
larly difficult to answer. "26 Answering many of these empirical
questions requires the development of sophisticated research tools and
methodologies with which to test the hypotheses generated by TJ
analysis. Until this occurs, and unless TJ is supported by empirical
data, the enterprise's persuasive force will be primarily theoretical and
speculative. As Slobogin states,
the indeterminacy of the empirical information on which thera-
peutic jurisprudence relies may be exacerbated by the defini-
tional dilemma [inherent in the term "therapeutic"]. The
typical uncertainty of social science, although frustrating, does
not vitiate its usefulness to the law. But the social science
generated by TJ may be unusually uncertain. If so, TJ will be
relatively more speculative, for a longer period of time. In the
meantime, its proposals may be hard to take seriously.
27
When this is the case, the only formal means of presenting a TJ-
inspired argument is through briefs, and the legal puissance of the
method is thus constrained.
Consider Professor La Fond's recent contention that sexual pred-
ator laws are "so destructive of the human psyche"28 that they should
be overturned on public policy grounds. He constructs his argument,
in part, by examining how Washington State has implemented its sex-
ual predator statute.29 He relies heavily on anecdotal evidence, noting
23. Margolis, supra note 19, at 213 (citing LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING-
PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 25 (2d ed. 1999).
24. Winick, supra note 2, at 508.
25. Slobogin, supra note 3, at 204.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 208.
28. La Fond, supra note 6, at 378.
29. Id. at 382-401.
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the conditions inside the "Special Commitment Center,"3 the secure
wing of a maximum-security prison where persons committed under
the Washington statute are housed, and the responses of various
personnel and public officials to the law's implementation.31
La Fond then turns to Winick's predominantly theoretical TJ
critique of sexual predator laws to suggest that the anecdotal evidence
La Fond has presented may illustrate the kinds of unanticipated anti-
therapeutic effects that may result from such laws.32 For example, he
relies on Winick's theory that sexual predator laws may have a nega-
tive impact on the individuals committed under those laws by labeling
them as "predators," thus diminishing their own sense of responsibil-
ity for their actions.33 Accordingly, he suggests, among other things,
that TJ research:
might demonstrate that the costs of enacting and implementing
a predator law are enormous and divert scarce resources away
from more effective crime control strategies. It might demon-
strate that the predator law inhibits treatment for other sex
offenders. Perhaps studies would show that these laws create
excessive fear and anxiety in the community at large, generating
a sort of sex offender paranoia that inhibits a sense of commu-
nity and freedom. 4
In his conclusion, La Fond recommends that "TJ must develop a
normative philosophy [as well as] rhetorical strategies for responding
to a law whose goal is expressly antitherapeutic. TJ must move
beyond simply contributing a perspective from which public-policy
analysis can evaluate such a law and its impact on intended and
unintended targets.35
What happens when and if, through the contraction of "pain-
staking"36 methodologies, TJ research actually produces empirical
results supporting La Fond's argument? How should those empirical
results be presented in the legal arena? If TJ scholars accept La
Fond's invitation and develop a "normative philosophy [as well as]
rhetorical strategies for responding to [antitherapeutic] law[s]," 37
should it be presented to appellate courts through the same mechan-
isms as its supporting empirical data?
30. Id. at 386.
31. Id. at 386-401.
32. Id. at 401-05 (citing Winick, supra note 2).
33. Id. at 401.
34. Id. at 413.
35. Id.
36. Slobogin, supra note 3, at 207.
37. La Fond, supra note 6, at 413.
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This Article argues that appellate briefs remain the appropriate
means through which empirical data used to support TJ-inspired
propositions are presented. Although the opportunity to present
empirical data supporting one's legal argument through the accredited
mechanism of expert witnesses is tantalizing for advocates who have
recently come into possession of "hard" evidence as part of their
tactical arsenals, the introduction of nonlegal materials, such as social
science data, is particularly suited to supporting policy-based argu-
ments in the appellate arena.
A significant outgrowth of legal realism was the refinement of the
doctrine of judicial notice. Until Professor Davis' exposition of the
concept of legislative fact in an influential 1942 article in the Harvard
Law Review, the use of judicial notice had been limited to the relative-
ly sterile evidentiary mechanism of admitting factual evidence without
the necessity of formal proof. Professor Davis distinguished between
adjudicative facts-facts about "what the parties did, what the circum-
stances were, what the background conditions were" 3 -8 --and legislative
facts-facts that are used for all other purposes.3 9 Although it was
well-accepted that adjudicative facts could be judicially noticed by
courts, that is, received into evidence without resorting to formal
proof,
[I]t is plain that in common usage the term ["judicial notice"]
embraces even more than this, including much that is neither
indisputable nor easily verifiable. Thus, it is said that courts
judicially notice so-called "legislative fact"-information about
social, economic, and political matters that goes into the making
of law or policy. Though rarely questioned, this practice is
sometimes explained in terms of the court's untrammeled free-
dom in the law-ascertaining process and sometimes on the
ground that a requirement of indisputability seems inappropri-
ate... where the facts are often generalized and statistical and
where their use is more nearly argumentative, or as a help to
value-judgments, than conclusive or demonstrative.4 °
In coining the term "legislative facts," Davis included both those
nonadjudicative facts that are used as part of the judicial reasoning
process and those nonadjudicative facts that are used to formulate new
38. Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942).
39. Adjudicative facts are those facts that are ordinarily within the exclusive province of the
jury, whereas legislative facts are those properly considered by courts as part of their function in
interpreting and making new law. See id. at 402-23.
40. Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1089
(1966).
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legal rules and principles. An example of the former are those
assumptions "imputed to judges and juries as part of their necessary
mental outfit" to engage in convenient forms of reasoning.4' Despite
their appellation as "legislative," the myriad of "nonevidence" facts
used in this fashion play an adjudicatory role, aiding in the compre-
hension of "evidentiary" facts by supplying necessary assumptions
about the ordinary use of language.
A second category of legislative facts is used to set forth an
epistemological framework within which to view the "evidentiary" or
adjudicated facts of a case. This species of legislative facts also plays
an adjudicatory function in that it assists in the process of judicial
reasoning at the trial court level. Social science data used to support
TJ-inspired scholarship will often fall into this category.42
The final category of legislative facts, which might be "pure"
legislative facts, are those facts that "inform[ ] a court's legislative
judgment on questions of law and policy"43 and "help the tribunal to
determine the content of law and policy and to exercise its judgment
or discretion in determining what course of action to take."44 Indeed,
it has been stated that, "[a] paradigmatic legislative fact is one that
shows the general effect a legal rule will have, and is presented to
41. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 279-80
(1898). As the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 notes,
[E]very case involves the use of hundreds or thousands of non-evidence facts. When
a witness in an automobile accident case says "car," everyone, judge and jury in-
cluded, furnishes, from non-evidence sources within himself, the supplementing
information that the "car" is an automobile, not a railroad car, that it is self-propelled,
probably by an internal combustion engine, that it may be assumed to have four
wheels with pneumatic rubber tires, and so on. The judicial process cannot construct
every case from scratch, like Descartes creating a world based on the postulate Cogito,
ergo sum.
FED. R. EVID. 201, advisory committee's note.
42. The empirical research suggested by Professor La Fond with respect to sexual predator
statutes is most appropriately viewed as falling within this category, as La Fond anticipates that
it will be useful for establishing a background against which to evaluate evidence that a sexual
predator law was actually enacted for treatment purposes: "[The research] might, in the future,
persuade Justice Kennedy, other Justices in the Hendricks majority, or perhaps other courts
considering constitutional challenges to other predator laws, that a particular predator law had
become a retributive mechanism and should be struck down on Constitutional grounds." La
Fond, supra note 6, at 411.
Professor David Faigman has proposed that legislative facts used for purposes such as this be
called "constitutional review" facts. David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Find-
ing": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541,
553 (1991). The original "Brandeis brief," in which future Justice Brandeis presented extensive
social science research to demonstrate that Oregon had a rational basis for restricting women's
work hours on public safety grounds, among others, is an example of "legislative fact" used in
this fashion. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
43. Davis, supra note 38, at 404.
44. Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955).
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encourage the decisionmaker to make a particular legal rule."4
Accordingly, they are appropriate for the policy-based reasoning proc-
esses, as they provide the basis for predicting what effects a particular
rule will have.46 In explaining how policy-based reasoning can best be
supported using extra-legal materials, such as social science data, in
the appellate arena, Professor Margolis states:
Policy-based reasoning involves an assessment of whether a pro-
posed legal rule will benefit society, or advance a particular
social goal. In making this determination, courts are required to
identify a desirable result, and then consider whether the opera-
tion of the proposed rule will encourage that result, as well as
discourage undesirable results. Because a new rule will likely be
of general applicability, courts must consider how a proposed
rule will work for future litigants, as well as for society as a
whole.47
In their seminal article on the reception of social science research
by courts, Professors Monahan and Walker critique Professor Ken-
neth Davis' widely-accepted distinction between "adjudicative" and
"legislative" facts, stating that it fails to provide a sound basis upon
which courts should treat social science data.4" However, they appear
to concede that social science data is properly characterized as legisla-
tive fact when used for the purpose of evaluating policy considerations
in the creation of new law.49
On the other hand, Walker and Monahan imply that empirical
research should not really be considered legislative fact when it is case-
specific or used for the narrow purpose of "adjudicat[ing] an issue
within a settled legal context."5 " Because such research "has general-
ity" and "bears... no substantive implications beyond the specific
45. Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 111, 114 (1988).
46. Margolis, supra note 19, at 213.
47. Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
48. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Estab-
lishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485 (1986) [hereinafter Monahan &
Walker, Social Authority]. See also Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A
New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan,
Social Frameworks]. See generally JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
LAW: CASES & MATERIALS (1985).
49. Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 48, at 485. ("We accept Davis's
insight that empirical information can play two distinctly different roles in legal decision-
making.").
50. Id. at 491. As an example of social science data used in this manner, Monahan men-
tions the use of surveys in a trademark case to demonstrate the prevalence of customer confusion.
Id. at 517 n.40.
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case in which it is introduced,'" it is appropriate to present such re-
search to the trial court resolving the specific case in the usual manner
of presenting evidence-in this case, through expert witnesses.
In a follow-up article, Monahan and Walker specify yet another
function for social science data: its use in creating a background con-
text for understanding the adjudicative facts of a case.52 This kind of
data, which they call "social framework" 3 data, is quite similar, and
perhaps identical, to the second category of legislative facts described
above.
TJ-inspired research will often be used to create a social frame-
work.54 For example, in a study conducted before the advent of the TJ
framework, but one in which the principles now espoused by TJ pro-
ponents figure prominently, Professor Peggy Cooper Davis noted the
frequency with which courts take judicial notice of psychological
parent theories in deciding child custody cases.55 Accordingly, she
recommended the development of formal mechanisms for the judicial
reception of legislative facts when used in this fashion.56 However, as
noted by Professor Margolis, such theories, despite their characteriza-
tion as legislative facts, nonetheless perform an adjudicatory func-
tion. 7 Accordingly, the use of such evidence in evaluating the factual
context of the case militates in favor of its consideration at the trial
court level:
Whether called social framework or legislative fact, it is clear
that non-legal information introduced for the purpose of assess-
ing adjudicative facts should be presented to the trial court, and
not on appeal. Social science used in this way does not, or at
least not directly, influence the court's selection of a rule of law.
Instead, social framework evidence influences a judge or jury's
view of the facts. The use of legislative facts for this purpose is
very different than their use to support policy arguments."
Monahan and Walker, however, were not concerned as much
with the proper arena in which to present social science data as they
were with the appropriate mechanisms through which the data was
51. Id. at 491.
52. See Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 48.
53. Id. at 560-61.
54. See David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight
Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. SC. &
L. 485 (1989).
55. See Peggy C. Davis, "There Is a Book Out... ": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of
Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1589, 1547-48 (1987).
56. Id. at 1599-1600.
57. Margolis, supra note 19, at 216.
58. Id. (citation omitted).
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presented. In this regard, they advocate the introduction of social
science research through written briefs rather than through strictures
of formal proof.59 They argue that social science research should be
treated in the same manner as prior judicial precedent, i.e., that social
science "knowledge" has the necessary attributes of legal "knowl-
edge," to warrant its consideration by courts in similar fashion.
For Monahan and Walker, the crucial conjunction between
social science data and law is their generality: "[B]oth produce princi-
ples applicable beyond particular instances. '60  Elaborating on this
common feature, they state:
An important aspect of the generality that social science and law
share is that they both typically address future, as-yet-unknown
contingencies. Scientific findings are evaluated in part by their
heuristic value by their ability to order and make understand-
able new phenomena. Likewise, a court decision comes to be
accorded the status of precedent when it is found to embody a
principle that assists in the resolution of a subsequent conflict.61
Furthermore, it is clear that the appellate arena will most often
benefit from the results of social science research when it is used to
support policy-based argumentation:
It is also the predictive nature of the policy argument that makes
the appellate brief the appropriate medium in which to cite non-
legal material. The purpose of the policy argument is to per-
suade the court to adopt (or refuse to adopt) a new legal rule,
and facts are used to help the court determine the content of the
law. Because it will be the appellate court, not the trial court,
that ultimately makes the decision about the content of the law,
it is not only appropriate, but [also] logical, to introduce non-
legal material in support of policy arguments at the appellate
stage.62
Although, as Slobogin noted, the development of methodologies
to confirm the hypotheses suggested by TJ scholars may be "painstak-
ing"" work, the relative empirical uncertainty characteristic of thera-
peutic jurisprudence work will not render it meaningless in the
appellate arena. As Winick has stated, "The perhaps inevitable inde-
terminacy of such research does not vitiate its usefulness; it merely
59. Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 48, at 496-97.
60. Id. at 490.
61. Id. at491.
62. Margolis, supra note 19, at 214 (citation omitted).
63. Slobogin, supra note 3, at 207.
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requires caution in its use. "64 As the enterprise develops, however, it
is clear that empirical social science research supporting TJ proposi-
tions recommending a hierarchical reordering of competing legal prin-
ciples should be considered by appellate courts in their role of creating
new law. Because these extra-legal materials "serve a unique function
in supporting policy arguments [that] are different from other uses of
legislative facts[ .... ] the appellate court is the appropriate forum in
which to use them."
65
V. THE POTENTIAL OF A LEGISLATIVE FACT REMAND FOR
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Accordingly, we have seen that it is appropriate for appellate
courts to consider the "therapeutic impact of law" strand of TJ schol-
arship; furthermore, appellate briefs are the most likely mechanisms
through which to present TJ propositions. In addition, empirical
research marshaled in support of TJ propositions is properly charac-
terized as legislative fact that is also appropriately presented through
appellate briefs. As long as TJ maintains that therapeutic values are
but a single consideration for appellate courts in the task of weighing
competing normative values, the appellate brief appears adequate.
However, if TJ embraces a normative ideological framework,
such as the one urged by La Fond, the TJ enterprise would take on a
character not unlike that of the mixed questions of law and fact that
often pose so much difficulty to appellate courts.66 Accordingly, the
presentation of empirical research, a course of action that La Fond
would presumably continue to endorse, and the underlying ideology
poses, through the same mechanism, a potentially disturbing prospect:
that the force of the normative argument depends on what amounts to
an appellate referendum on the persuasiveness of the social science
research.67 As Korn has so eloquently put it: "Sometimes the law's
64. Winick, supra note 13, at 196.
65. Margolis, supra note 19, at 211.
66. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104
(1985). One scholar has referred to the category of mixed questions of law and fact as "a
wonderfully mushy classification." Stuart M. Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice:
Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 360 (1999).
67. This prospect, of course, exists for traditional TJ analysis as well. However, in this
regard, the difference between the ideologically-neutral enterprise currently embraced by most
TJ proponents and the one recommended by La Fond is really a question of whether or not the
argument survives to persuade another day if social science data is not considered persuasive.
The "traditional" TJ appellate advocate asserts simply that the therapeutic effects of a law are
important; see Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence View, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 253 (1996) ("Among the many public policy considera-
tions that might enter into this determination, the Court should examine closely the therapeutic
or antitherapeutic consequences of its decision."), whereas the "ideological" TJ advocate asserts
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reference to science may merely provide a veneer of scientific deter-
minism to decisions that really turn on policy considerations to which
the scientific referent bears little relation."6  The trick will be to
preserve the opportunity to present empirical data to support the
consideration of therapeutic values without misrepresenting its policy-
oriented and normative character.
In distinguishing between adjudicative facts and legislative facts,
Davis believed that formal restraints on the judicial notice of most
categories of legislative facts were inappropriate. Because the weigh-
ing of policy considerations entails the consideration of generalizable
facts-the accuracy of many of which are disputable-Davis believed
that it was unwise to constrain the courts' pursuit of these facts to
unduly restrictive standards. Arguing that the legislative fact-finding
function of the courts is not suitable to the formal procedures applica-
ble to the judicial notice of adjudicative facts, Davis noted, "[w]hat the
law needs at its growing points is more, not less, judicial thinking
about the factual ingredients of problems of what the law ought to
be. ,69
The advisory committee's comment to Federal Rule of Evidence
201, which governs the judicial notice of adjudicative facts, embraced
Professor Davis's view. Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not contain a rule regulating the reception of legislative facts, stat-
ing that "any limitation in the form of indisputability, any formal
requirements of notice other than those already inherent in affording
opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging briefs, and any
requirement of formal findings at any level... [are inappropriate]"."°
However, the committee made the intriguing and somewhat cryptic
suggestion that "[judicial access to legislative facts] should, however
leave open the possibility of introducing evidence through regular
channels in appropriate situations."71 As a clue to what these "regular
channels" might be, the committee cited with approval the United
States Supreme Court's remand in Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Bald-
win" to the trial court "for the taking of evidence as to the economic.
that the therapeutic effects of a law have but a supporting role within a larger normative frame-
work.
68. Kom, supra note 40, at 1098; see also Winick, supra note 13, at 190 ("Any form of
consequentialism must be careful to avoid equating a description of a rule's consequences with a
normative conclusion about the rule's value.").
69. Kenneth C. Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in
PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69, 83 (1964).
70. See FED. R. EVID. 201, advisory committee's note.
71. Id.
72. 293 U.S. 194 (1934).
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conditions and trade practices underlying the New York Milk Control
Law. P73
The advisory committee's suggestion of a legislative fact remand
has not caught on, though it has received the attention of several
scholars over the years. 4 In a 1975 article examining the flow of infor-
mation to the United States Supreme Court, Professors Miller and
Barron concluded that "[riemand to the trial court for findings of
legislative fact is within the power of the Supreme Court ... If rou-
tinely done, it would go far toward obviating the disquietude
expressed by those who feel that a freewheeling employment of judi-
cial notice at the Supreme Court level leaves much to be desired.""
In many ways, a remand to the trial court for the reception of
empirical research in support of a TJ-inspired argument would be
more desirable than the presentation of such research through an ap-
pellate brief. Professor Karst has noted that trial courts are the more
appropriate forum for the presentation of legislative facts because they
are more familiar with the fact-finding process than appellate courts,
the parties are more likely to play a more active role in the introduc-
tion of the legislative facts, the facts are more likely to be subject to
scrutiny, and trial judges will be less likely to seek out information on
their own.76 Similarly, Miller and Barron cite an excerpt from a
constitutional law scholar, whose findings they reported in their 1975
article:
If [the consideration of social science data] is appropriate, it
deserves to be introduced in the trial court record and subject to
scrutiny, criticism, challenge, etc. To be sure, cross-examination
and the adversary system won't determine scientific validity, but
73. FED. R. EVID. 201, advisory committee's note.
74. See John F. Jackson, The Brandeis Brief-Too Little, Too Late: The Trial Court as a
Superior Forum for Presenting Legislative Facts, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 2 (1993); David L.
Suggs, The Use of Psychological Research by the Judiciary, 3 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAV. 135, 144
(1979); Kenneth C. Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 940 (1980); Kenneth
L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 98.
Professor Benjamin recently examined the entire landscape of appellate fact finding in an ex-
haustive article. See Benjamin, supra note 66 (concluding that appellate courts, when faced with
the prospect of facts that have changed since their determination by the trial court, should update
the facts on their own rather than remand the case to the trial court or issue an opinion based on
stale facts). See also John C. Godbold, Fact Finding by Appellate Courts-An Available and
Appropriate Power, 12 CUMB. L. REV. 365, 366 (1982) (supporting the power of appellate courts'
to review facts). On the issue of fact-finding by appellate courts in civil law systems, see COM-
PARATIVE LAW 456-57 (Rudolph B. Schlesinger et al. eds., 5th ed. 1988).
75. Arthur S. Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and
the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1236 (1975).
76. See Jackson, supra note 74, at 3, 41.
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they seem preferable to casual introduction of such evidence on
appeal without opportunity to examine it. 7
Professor Margolis has criticized this reasoning, arguing that
appellate briefs remain the superior method of introducing legislative
facts.7" She notes that appellate courts do not rely exclusively of prag-
matic balancing-the form of reasoning for which the introduction of
legislative facts is most useful-in reaching their decisions, and instead
use a variety of reasoning methods. However, because a legislative
fact remand is entirely within the discretion of the appellate court, it
would appear that the cases in which the device would actually be
used would be those in which the appellate judges believe that a bal-
ancing of the pertinent empirical data is appropriate. Although the
introduction of legislative facts to the trial court in all cases would
certainly constitute a waste of resources in some instances, the actua-
tion of the device at the appellate level would seem to self-select those
cases in which it would be most useful.
Margolis also contends that appellate courts do not confer upon
lower courts' findings of legislative facts any additional deference
beyond that given to factual findings, citing studies which bear this
proposition out.79 Again, however, the actuation of the legislative fact
remand at the request of the appellate court in the first instance would
appear to resolve the problem. Because the technique would not be
used until after the appellate court has received the full trial record, it
allows for the conceptual separation of the trial court's factual find-
ings, which would be used for the purpose of applying existing law,
and the trial court's legislative fact findings, which would be used for
the purpose of creating new law. This would avoid what one scholar
77. Miller & Barron, supra note 75, at 1236 (citing survey response).
78. Margolis, supra note 19, at 200-03.
79. Id. at 217 (citing Faigman, supra note 42, at 553). It is well-accepted that the factual
findings of a trial court are subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) is usually cited for this proposition. It provides in part, "[f]indings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
However, it is curious that neither Federal Civil Procedure Rule 1 nor Rule 81, the two rules
governing the applicability and scope of the Rules, provides for the applicability of the Rules to
courts of appeals. See FED R. Civ. P. 1; FED. R. Civ. P. 81. Furthermore, the argument that
rules of court are presumptively applicable to courts of appeals absent express indication to the
contrary appears to be refuted by the provision in Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(a), which
provides explicitly that "[lt]hese rules apply to the United States district courts .... [and] the
United States courts of appeals." FED. R. EvID. 1101(a). Furthermore, a number of federal
courts have specifically held that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to courts of appeals.
Hines v. Royal Indemnity Co., 253 F.2d 111, (6th Cir. 1958); Nachod v. Engineering &
Research Corp., 108 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1939); Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 129 F.2d
481, 484 (7th Cir. 1942).
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has referred to as the "indeterminate" standard governing mixed ques-
tions of fact and law: "[the] deferential review of mixed questions of
law and fact is warranted when it appears that the district court is
better positioned than the appellate court to decide the issue in ques-
tion or that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity
of legal doctrine."8
There is an additional reason why a legislative fact remand might
be suitable for the introduction of empirical research of the therapeutic
impact of law. TJ proponents often press for the reconsideration of an
existing law based on its antitherapeutic impact on persons other than
those who are likely to litigate the law. For example, Winick has
forcefully argued that sexual predator statutes may have an antithera-
peutic impact on treatment providers81 and La Fond has noted the
antitherapeutic impact of sexual predator statutes on the public offi-
cials participating in the process. These public officials are perhaps
one of the least likely classes to bring a constitutional challenge to such
statutes.82  Consider further La Fond's speculation that "studies
[might] show that these laws create excessive fear and anxiety in the
community at large, generating a sort of sex offender paranoia that in-
hibits a sense of community and freedom."83 A trial court may simply
be less inclined to consider evidence of a statute's antitherapeutic
impact when the evidence does not involve one of the parties immedi-
ately before it.
Although trial courts are better positioned than appellate courts
to scrutinize empirical evidence on this issue, appellate courts are
better suited to the task of weighing the force of those studies against
other normative values. Remanding the case to the trial court for the
consideration of the full panoply of empirical research bearing on the
issue resolves the problem engendered by the unrestricted access to
the research by appellate courts due to its unsuitability to formal proof
or judicial notice. The technique allows for the consideration of
concerns that TJ is well-positioned to answer: "The freedom of
inquiry that judicial notice offers may entail its own problems of
assuring accuracy, fairness, and notice to the parties, and-when the
decision has significance for future cases as well as for the one at
hand-due attention to the public interest. "84
80. Benjamin, supra note 66, at 360 (citing Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,
233 (1991) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
81. See Winick, supra note 2, at 544-45.
82. See La Fond, supra note 6, at 406-08.
83. Id. at 413.
84. Korn, supra note 40, at 1090 (emphasis added).
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Perhaps the development of TJ-inspired appellate advocacy will
inspire an interest in resurrecting the legislative fact remand device.
Any use of the device is sure to stimulate additional research on the
therapeutic consequences of laws being challenged. Most importantly,
however, it will allow appellate courts to engage in pragmatic balanc-
ing of legitimate therapeutic effects while preserving their ability to
consider the policy-based force of future TJ arguments.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, the notion that a legislative fact remand
will acquire a following in the appellate arena is remote, at least in the
near future. However, the potential for TJ-inspired creative tech-
niques at the appellate level is considerable, as appellate courts repr-
sent an especially fertile and appropriate forum for TJ-inspired appe-
late advocacy.
Furthermore, the concept of the legislative fact remand can oper-
ate as a device used simply to differentiate the "therapeutic adminis-
tration" and "therapeutic impact of law" strands of TJ scholarship
through a comparison of the evidentiary mechanisms through which
arguments under those different strands should be made to appellate
courts. Although trial courts are perhaps best suited to the task of
determining, as a factual matter, the antitherapeutic effects of particu-
lar laws, appellate courts are the more appropriate judicial forum for
the consideration of how they should be weighed vis-A-vis other
normative values. At the very least, then, the legislative fact remand
should, as a conceptual construct, serve as but one way to preserve the
distinction between the two very different strands of therapeutic juris-
prudence.
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